ISG's Iraq: The Big Picture

A practical and simple set of questions can "cut to the chase" when dealing with complex processes in an organization.

• What are your objectives?
• Are they worth it? (What are the consequences of both success or failure? Usually measured in dollars)
• Do you have concrete, measurable goals in support of your objectives?
• Are you executing to these goals?
• Are you measuring and reacting to your risks realtime?

In the west, public opinion about Iraq is all over the place. There were people for it originally who are against it now, and vice-versa. Our primary feedback mechanism, media reports, tell us every day about new bombings and atrocities. In addition, just like my example, everybody has their area of expertise and they are fairly blind in other areas. The military are experts on various types of military missions, but are out of depth when it comes to flexibility and agile project management. Other agencies are inept and muddled when it comes to using military power. Citizens who are religious see the war in religious terms and care less about pragmatism. Citizens who are realists see short term choices and regulate most predictions about the future as being unreliable. Our recent election made several of our anti-peacekeeping voices a lot louder.

So I suggest that let's all take a deep breath, back away, and look at the situation in Iraq dispassionately. It's The Big Picture. I am not going to fight the battle of the-mistake-we-went-in again, nor am I going to reminisce about if-only-Iraq-were-Switzerland. Let's ask the questions we would ask any organization and see what the Iraq Study Group has for answers. Let's specifically ask what the objectives are and are they worth it. We can do the other questions later, but I feel that even this may be too much for some readers.

What are your objectives?

Oddly enough, we go through 30 pages in the ISG report until they finally get around to telling us what our goals are. On page 31 they say:

We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the President: an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself. In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadly representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't brutalize its own people.

In my opinion, this is a mushy list. There are no positive, clear, measurement criteria. "Governing itself" could mean any number of things, as could "sustaining itself" and "defending itself" Never fear though, Lets play around with the wording a bit. It seems the goals of the US are:
1. Continued elections even if people who are against the US get elected
2. Iraq pays its own bills for security and whatever else it wants
3. Iraq has an army that can keep the Iranians, Syrians, Turks, and Saudis and others from making Iraq their backyard proxy war

In addition, we also want to make sure:
4. No use of Iraq as a terrorist base
5. No abusing the Iraqi people

How do we measure each of these objectives? Let's give it a shot. To reach each goal you must:
1. Continue to have elections where the government changes and new blood is brought in
2. Demonstrate the majority of the infrastructure money in Iraq comes from Iraqi sources
3. This is subjective, and can only be measured by opinion. I believe the opinion of the Iraqi public would be the ones to measure. So -- make sure the Iraqi people are happy with the degree of infiltration and influence from foreign powers
4. This is also subjective, and requires the United States to make a judgment, just as we do in other countries. A house with 3 idiots with bombs in it is not a terrorist base. I believe this is something that is negotiated on an ongoing basis between the US and foreign governments. So we build a repeatable consistent system of identifying and using violent force against terrorists in Iraq that is amenable to both parties
5. Civil rights, elimination of death squads, no torture, etc -- great objectives, certainly. But it is not up to us to define this further. If Iraq is selecting and rotating its leaders, and it the people regularly speak, then the people of Iraq will decide what degree of personal freedom they are willing to trade for security. As long as they have free political speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to vore, it would be unwise and hypocritical for us to judge them as if they were bugs under our microscope. If they want to summarily execute rebels, as we did in the civil war, or burn homes to the ground, or imprison people with little legal recourse, we may not approve of these things, but we are not the ones who count. So -- the American people feel that the Iraqis are free enough to change political leaders and we stay out of the way for the rest of it.

Out of our five objectives, two can be objectively measured externally, two are the business of the Iraqis, and one is a joint effort between friendly countries. For those objectives that are the responsibility of the Iraqis to measure, we are indeed in an interesting pickle: we have national goals that we are not responsible for measuring or defining success. Without getting into the constitutionality of such goals, they seem problematic at best. Number 3 especially seems tricky: we obviously have skin in the game as we don't want foreign powers making Iraq a playground, but whether that is actually happening or not is debatable ad infinitum unless those powers actually start setting up puppet governments with little flags on the government buildings. I am concerned that the American public does not know enough on an ongoing basis to understand or decide progress on this objective even if it is ours to manage.

It is very interesting that "Stopping the bombing" is not a direct objective. Obviously it is impossible to completely stop the bombing, and the question of what degree of bombing is acceptable is one for the Iraqis to decide. Also missing was "Secure our troops". Many people seem to view any loss of American life as too much, for those people it seems the ISG can only offer generalities. Troops and resources should be expended in support of our objectives, to the degree that the resulting equation makes sense, it appears. Which leads us to our second question.

Is it worth it?

There are two ways to measure worth, the value of success and the pain of defeat. The ISG has something to say on both of these counts. On the value of success, immediately following on page 31 we have this nugget:

"it will offer people of Iraq a reasonable opportunity to lead a better life than they did under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of the policy alternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it includes the best strategies and tactics available to us to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's interests and values in the years ahead"

So the upside is:
1. Iraqis have a better life than they did before
2. We positively influence the region
3. Iraqis can pursue a better future
4. It serves our interests

Pardon me, but this verbiage is not very useful. What is the dollar value of the benefits of this plan? How do we measure the benefit in real terms of any of this? Is this an Iraqi plan, or an American plan?

So what are we trying to avoid? What's the pain if we fail?

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world. Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq's government and economy would further cripple a country already unable to meet its people?s needs. Iraq's security forces could split along sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost.

Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons.

Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections -- perhaps fomented by Iran -- in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora's box of problems --including the radicalization of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes -- that might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy.

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's." Left unchecked, al Qaeda in Iraq could continue to incite violence between Sunnis and Shia. A chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will seek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq." A senior European official told us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within his country.

The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos.
Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities.
Perceived failure there could diminish America's credibility and influence in a region that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world's energy supply. This loss would reduce America's global influence at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances. And the longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in Afghanistan increase.

Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the government's handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections were largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments about continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the government that the United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of the American people.

They also make sure that people know that these are just informed opinions, nothing guaranteed. So let's sort this list out. The pain for us looks like:
1. A humanitarian catastrophe that we would be forced to respond to
2. Another strongman takes Iraq and uses it's resources to cause problems for us
3. Significant violence crosses the borders into neighboring countries causing instability
4. Countries overtly sending troops into Iraq to support various sides
5. Broader regional war that we would be forced to enter
6. Iran gains more power in the region and becomes a bigger problem
7. Decades of instability as countries and populations re-align
8. Drop in oil production leads to extremely high energy prices
9. More terrorism, including for our European allies
10. Less leverage on North Korea
11. Iraqis completely despise their liberators
12. The American people decide to quit and throw away both the good and the bad in the region in a spasm of hopelessness

Wow! That's some kind of list. But these negatives are always trumped up a bit in these papers. Just to spot a bit to those doubters out there, let's pick the easiest half and assume the rest is just over-stretching. That would be less leverage on NK, bigger Iranian problem, another Saddam, a humanitarian catastrophe, Iraqis hate us completely, and instability in the region.

Once again, there are no dollar figures, but let's give it some thought. To deal with these negatives it would take at least the same amount of commitment we have today. We're going to contain another Saddam, move troops around the region, deliver humanitarian aid under fire and dissuade the Iranians? Heck, we could end up in five years with the same situation in Saudi Arabia as we have today in Iraq, with Iraq being even worse.

How about if things turn out well? From page 7:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.

From what I hear, that means up to twenty thousand trainers, plus force protection, plus rapid reaction and special operations. That's not counting SoCom or the other troops in the general region. Let's call it 40 thousand troops. So we're in Iraq, with a lot of troops, no matter how Iraq turns out.

One can make the case that total isolationism and quitting the region completely gives us security, but I do not believe that holds up under any sort of scrutiny. So, from the bipartisan report, we are left with an understanding that we're in the region, in force and taking casualties, for the foreseeable future. In fact, if things go to hell in a hand basket, we're going to need many more resources. Not exactly clear from the 86-page report that was issued, but in there nonetheless.

These negative "What ifs" are usually referred to as risks -- bad things we worry about happening. We take the cost of the thing happening and multiply it by the likelihood of it happening. This dollar figure is referred to as exposure. The goal is to allocate resources to cover your exposure, in other words, to CYA if the negatives actually happen.

I have one simple question for our government: if our force commitment is likely to remain the same in the region or increase dramatically, where are the plans to handle this? Where are the twenty thousand trainers for Iraq to relieve the combat troops, where are the plans for another 6 or 7 medium infantry divisions (including perhaps reactivating the 5th and 6th Marine Divisions)? Right now I don't want to know whether the ISG's recommendations are good or not. We can and should argue that another day. Based on this report, and looking at both the upside and downside of our objectives, I want to know where is the common sense to make our situation better in 2 or 3 years covering all possibilities? Are we betting the farm again, or do we have the wisdom to make it work even if things go south? The ISG has given us a worst-case scenario; can we make sure we're prepared and ready to take advantage of any situation as it happens?

The question I have for the readers is this: should these be our objectives, and do you agree that the reward and pain cost estimates are in the ballpark?